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Abstract: The global transition to a low-carbon economy will involve changes in material markets and 
supply chains on a hitherto unknown scale and scope. With these changes come numerous challenges and 
opportunities related to supply chain security and sustainability. To help support decision-making as well 
as future research, this study employs a problem-oriented perspective while reviewing academic 
publications, technical reports, legal documents, and published industry data to highlight the increasingly 
interconnected nature of material needs and geopolitical change. The paper considers a broad set of issues 
including technologies, material supplies, investment strategies, communal concerns, innovations, 
modeling considerations, and policy trends to help contextualize policy decisions and regulatory responses.  
Policy options are outlined for each topical section, as well as areas for further research. Together, these 
recommendations serve to help guide the complex, interdisciplinary approach to materials required for a 
low-carbon transition.   
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EVs - electric vehicles 
PV - photovoltaic 
LIB - lithium-ion batteries 
LCO - lithium cobalt oxide 
NCM - nickel cobalt manganese 
LFP - lithium iron phosphate 
REE - rare earth elements 
c-SI - crystalline silicon 
CIGS - copper indium gallium selenide 
CdTe - cadmium telluride 
DSSC - dye sensitive solar cells 
PMG - permanent magnet generator 
CSP - concentrated solar power 
GW - gigawatt 





BRI - Belt and Road Initiative 
NDC - nationally determined contribution 
STRADE - Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Raw Materials 
SOE - state owned enterprises 
HREE - heavy rare earth elements 
LREE - light rare earth elements 
PGM - platinum group metals 
RGI - resource governance index 
NRGI - Natural Resource Governance Institute 
IISD - International Institute for Sustainable Development 
ASM - artisanal or small scale mining 
ILO - International Labor Organization 




With the nearly global commitment to the 2015 UNFCCC Paris Agreement, and an ever-increasing 
portion of global energy consumption coming from renewable sources, the low-carbon nature of the world’s 
energy supply is solidifying [1]. The increased use of solar photovoltaics, battery storage, and wind energy 
in particular have proven the economic and technical feasibility of renewables. Reports and forecasts 
examining the general pace and requirements of this energy transition (e.g., [2]–[7]) have demonstrated the 
contours of the shift, but have also raised concerns regarding its mineral and metal requirements [2]–[7].  
Low-carbon scenarios often have—implicitly or explicitly—high and diverse material needs, 
depending on what assumptions are made about the nature of future energy systems. As certain technologies 
become more prominent, it becomes easier to identify what materials will be needed in the near term [2]. 
Limitations on these materials, along with competition for large portions of commonly produced materials, 
may inhibit the adoption of “game changing” technologies that are often considered vital to a nation's 
economic prosperity. The materials that have proven valuable in supporting the development of low-carbon 
technology are often listed alongside other “critical” materials (e.g., [8], [9])  and are central to the 
feasibility of the energy transition [8], [9]. Supply risks, stemming from geopolitical or environmental 
instability, along with sudden, unmanageable increases in demand for more commonly produced materials, 
can be detrimental to a nation's economic prosperity. The relationship between supply risk and economic 
importance has been explored by the European Commission and by various countries and organizations 
around the world. [8]. 
More focused investigations into specific minerals and metals (e.g., [10]–[14]) provide insight into 
the feasibility of meeting renewable energy requirements, but do not typically explore non-technical 
considerations such as investments, trade barriers, or geopolitical challenges [10]–[14]. With these 
considerations in mind, what material changes are necessary to achieve a renewable energy system, and 
how can policies support these changes? Equally importantly, what environmental, social, and political 
challenges are associated with low-carbon technologies, and how can they impact material supplies? To 
address these concerns, this review focuses on both grey and academic literature, especially those focused 
on energy outlooks and low-carbon technology, makes recommendations for policy interventions that could 
address these concerns, and highlights areas that require future research.  
This paper is divided up into several sections that each focus on a different aspect of the material 
requirements for the transition to lower CO2 energy systems (hereafter termed the energy transition). 
Section 2 provides an overview of prominent renewable energy technologies and their material concerns, 





overview of investment trends in the United States and China, along with possible implications for their 
impact on the energy transition. Section 5 focuses on the role of local communities and developing nations 
in material supply chains and the energy transition. Section 6 discusses how technical changes can influence 
the supply chain, and how material concerns can be mitigated. Section 7 provides context to economic 
discussions and potential shortcomings of economic forecasts, and Section 8 provides an overview of policy 
learning and political trends. Finally, Section 9 provides conclusions and identifies key areas for future 
research. 
2. Low-Carbon Technologies  
This section examines the material needs for the increased uptake of prominent renewable technologies, 
alongside market trends and future material projections. We focus on electric vehicles (EVs), solar 
Photovoltaics (PV), and wind energy, as they are commonly recognized as the cornerstones of the transition 
to low carbon energy.   
2.1 Electric Vehicles: Motors and Battery Storage 
  For energy storage and electric vehicles, lithium ion batteries (LIB) are a technological focus. There 
are several chemical variations of LIBs that differ with respect to their properties and stability. Currently, 
the most prominent EV and battery storage compositions are lithium-cobalt-oxide (LCO), nickel-cobalt-
manganese (NCM) and lithium-iron-phosphorus (LFP) [2], [10], [15], [16].  Lithium is used for electrolyte 
and anode productions, whereas copper, aluminum, and steel are used for various processes and assembly 
needs (Figure 1). The cathode is traditionally a layered transition-metal oxide composed of lithium 
compounds with cobalt, manganese, nickel, phosphorus, and iron [17], [18]. The rare earth elements (REE) 
neodymium and dysprosium are also used in electric motors’ permanent magnets to improve performance 
[2].  
  Due to its variety of technologies and rapid development, energy storage is among the most difficult 
of energy markets to predict. NCM batteries are becoming increasingly popular thanks to their wide range 
of power output and a steep decline in costs (84%) since 2010 [5]. As the world’s largest consumer of 
lithium, China has traditionally used LFP batteries for a variety of purposes, including electric buses, but 
NCM variations are still expected to control 90% of the market share by 2025–30 [15], [19]. Following the 
adoption of NCM batteries, and EVs becoming the lower cost option in 5-10 years, Bloomberg’s New 
Energy Outlook 2019 envisions electric vehicles adding about 3,950TWh of new electricity demand 
globally by 2050 and using 9% of the world’s electricity [5], [18]. However, from a production perspective, 
the World Bank estimates that a 1000% increase in cumulative material demand is expected from the rollout 
of energy storage technologies if the number of electric vehicles reaches 140 million by 2030 (Figure 2)  
[2].  
Critical energy storage materials in batteries include lithium, cobalt, and nickel, and in motors, 
neodymium, and dysprosium. Highly publicized concerns about child labor in artisanal cobalt mines in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the doubling of the royalty rate on cobalt in DRC in 2018, has 
generated a drive for EV suppliers to develop cobalt-free batteries in the near future [20]. An NCM battery 
with a 1-1-1- ratio has the highest cobalt usage but the lowest energy density, whereas an NCM battery with 
a 8-1-1 ratio has the lowest cobalt usage, but the highest energy density. This means that although 8-1-1 
NCM batteries have additional production costs and greater cell degradation (from the lack of stabilizing 
cobalt), they may well represent the next generation of cathodes as a result of increased capacity and lower 
cobalt content. However, the development of 8-1-1 NCM batteries has occurred at a slower pace than 
expected [21], [22]. Moores (2018) terms this the classic battle between the benefits of an existing supply 
chain and the energy density of new battery developments. In other words, these developments represent a 





to develop completely cobalt-free lithium batteries, but industry experts doubt their feasibility in the near 
term [20], [23], [24]. Månberger et. al (2018) and Giurco et. al. (2019) both put demand for cobalt at over 
400% of current reserves1 by 2050, with lithium demand also exceeding 100% of reserves, assuming no 
major reductions in metal intensity take place [7], [11]. Recycling opportunities for lithium batteries offer 
mitigating effects due to existing collection channels for lead-acid vehicle batteries [18]. From this, 
Dominish et al. (2019) state that the recycling rate for cobalt and nickel have the potential to be close to 
90% if suitable recycling industries scale up their operations, despite current recycling rates being nowhere 
near this level [18]. Reports on lithium recycling currently vary from 0-10%, although rates have the 





Figure 1: Overview of lithium-ion battery supply chain 
(Giurco et al. 2019)  
                                                     
1 Reserves are often 20% of resources or less, a function of investment, and should not be used as an 
indicator of long-term availability. Reserve values instead serve to contrast potential needs against the 






Figure 2: Median metals demand scenario for supplying 
energy storage technologies through 2050 
(World Bank 2017) 
 
2.2 Solar Photovoltaics (PV)  
Of the two types of PV panels used today, crystalline silicon (c-Si) PV panels account for 
approximately 95% of the global market [7]. By weight, a typical panel is composed of 76% glass, 5% 
silicon solar cells, 10% polymer that acts as an encapsulant and backsheet, 8% aluminum as a lightweight 
frame, 1% copper for interconnectors, less than 0.1% silver for contact lines, and trace amounts of other 
metals [25] (Figure 3). 
  Thin film technologies, copper-indium-gallium-selenide (CIGS) panels, and cadmium telluride 
(CdTe) account for the remainder of the market. The uncertainties around tellurium supply, and the 
supposed toxic nature of handling cadmium have raised concerns with thin film technologies, and it is not 
clear what the role of CdTe will be in the future [9],[26], [27]. There are also several solar PV technologies 
currently at the research stage, such as dye-sensitized solar cells (DSSC)/Grätzel-cells and perovskites that 
use other metals than current PV technologies [11],[28], [29]. These technologies could have a decisive 
impact on future metal used in solar PVs, but it remains uncertain whether they will be commercialized or 
not.  
Although the amount of material used in each solar panel has decreased since commercialization, 
silver still accounts for 20% of the panel value and is not consistently recycled due to process constraints 
[18], [30]. According to the International Technology Roadmap for Photovoltaics, silver consumption is 
expected to further decrease due to better metallization processes and substitution with copper or 
nickel/copper layers, but the changes will reach <15% of the market by 2028 [31]. The importance of 
recycling is highlighted by preliminary estimates that the raw materials recoverable from PV panels could 
cumulatively exceed USD 15 billion by 2050 [25]. For material needs, the World Bank estimates median 
metals demand for supplying solar photovoltaics through 2050 to increase by ≈150% to ≈300% for 2°C 





with estimates by Watari et. al (2018) and Valero et. al (2018) both putting demand for silver at ≈70% of 




Figure 3: Overview of solar PV panel supply chain  






Figure 4: Median metals demand scenario for supplying solar photovoltaics through 2050 





2.3 Wind Energy 
The most prominent wind turbine technology is a horizontal-axis turbine, with three blades that 
rotate upwind around a horizontal axis on a tower, and steel components accounting for 80% of the total 
weight. Other materials include bulk commodities such as copper, aluminum, concrete, and carbon [18], 
[33]. Rare earth metals (neodymium and dysprosium) are used in direct-drive permanent magnet generators 
and can be found in roughly 20% of all installed turbines [34]. Direct-drive generators are often favored for 
offshore installations due to reduced maintenance needs and increased reliability, with the role of each 
material being illustrated in Figure 5 [35] . 
With wind power already being one of the most established renewable technologies, requirements 
are not expected to change drastically. Off-shore technology does generally require a greater amount of 
materials, but concerns with supplies revolve around the increasing quantity of turbines using direct-drive 
permanent magnet generators (PMG). The Global Wind Energy Council’s 2018 report shows that the 
current share of the total global offshore installations represents four percent of the total 591 GW installed 
[36]. By 2025, the share is expected to exceed 10 percent, and the total installed based could reach 100 GW 
[36]. With neodymium and dysprosium being among the materials with the highest supply risks, Dominish 
et. al (2019) suggest that installation types are likely linked to supply constraints, and that PMG’s could be 
implemented in greater quantities if new rare earth mines and processing facilities are established  [8], [18]. 
However, as of 2019, there is no commercial recycling of neodymium or dysprosium, despite promising 
research from the Critical Materials Institute (CMI) and the Ames Laboratory [37]. The lack of a secondary 
supply for these metals is crucial, as the World Bank outlines median metals demand for wind technology 





same evaluation found possible cumulative demand for neodymium to increase to over 350,000 tons, 
despite current total annual production currently only being around 7,000 tons (Figure 6) [2].  
 
  
Figure 5: Overview of wind turbine supply chain 






Figure 6: Ranges for cumulative neodymium demand for global wind turbine production through 
2050 
(World Bank 2017) 
2.4 Other Technologies and Material Requirements 
Other renewable technologies that have been assessed based on their demand for critical materials 
are concentrated solar power, LED lights, power infrastructure, and fuel cells. The use of concentrated solar 
power (CSP) as a major global source of energy would lead to a large increase in demand for nitrate salts 
(NaNO3 and KNO3), silver, and steel alloys [38]. Among end use technologies, LED lights are preferred 
over incandescent light bulbs due to higher efficiency, but they require indium and other metals that are 
also used in thin film solar PVs [39]. The recent adoption of energy-efficient lighting technologies in 
general has led to increased demand for several critical raw materials including rare earths (Eu, Tb and Y), 
gallium, germanium and indium [39]. The next-generation of lighting technology, organic-LED (OLED), 
is expected to limit the need for critical materials, but wide adoption is not expected before 2025 [39]. 
Renewable energy transitions may also require materially intensive investments in power infrastructure, 
such as copper in HVDC-lines, and stationary grid storage with vanadium redox flow batteries [40]. 
Harmsen et al. (2013) estimate that deteriorating ore quality could lead to a gross energy requirement for 
copper production in 2050 that is 2–7 times higher than it is today [40]. Finally, the use of fuel cells for 
stationary storage and EVs requires the use of platinum, the price of which has historically been very 
sensitive to demand [41]. 
 
 
3. Material Supplies  
This section examines the markets, reserves, and supplies of the minerals needed for clean energy 
technologies to determine whether they could constrain the energy transition. We focus in particular on 
minerals that are thought to be directly impacted by the energy transition, including lithium, cobalt, rare 
earth minerals, indium, tellurium, and silver. 
 
Investigations into the material needs of the energy transition have left little doubt that a low-carbon 
economy will be more, rather than less, material intensive, but physical scarcity will most likely not be 
among possible limiting factors [2], [13], [18], [42]–[46]. Theoretical demands for various carbon 
mitigation objectives and assumed energy needs (e.g.,[10]–[14]) imply potential bottlenecks with drastic 
demand increases (Figure 7), but also highlight evolving opportunities provided by growing markets, 
reserves, and technological changes. This disconnect between mitigation and opportunity becomes 
especially tangible when examining reserves, resources, and supply across the world, as it is important to 







Figure 7: Cumulative demand from renewable energy and transport technologies to 2050 compared 
with reserves (Giurco et al. 2019) 
3.1 Lithium Supply 
Recent research indicates that the development of current lithium resources will allow for a sizeable 
market of electric vehicles (e.g., [12], [13], [47]–[50]), and will not act as a barrier to the energy transition 
[12], [13], [47]–[50]. Olivetti (2017), Gruber (2011), and Kushnir (2012), instead rightfully shift focus 
towards flow rate into society and supply security [10], [12], [13]. Three of the top five countries (Bolivia, 
China and Argentina) with the largest recoverable lithium stocks are associated with high forms of 
institutional risk, and are not producing as much as they are capable of [2]. This is exemplified by the U.S. 
Geological Survey’s 2019 mineral commodities summary, which cites Chile as having roughly three times 
the lithium reserves of Australia, despite Australia producing 51,000 tons to Chile’s 16,000 tons [9]. 
Similarly, Argentina’s 14.8 million tons of resources and 2,000,000 tons of reserves only produced 6200 
tons of the 85,000 tons of lithium extracted in 2018 [9].  
Partially due its aggressive stance on foreign involvement, Bolivia has yet to even develop its 
resources despite supposedly hosting 9 million tons of lithium resources [2], [9], [51]. In addition to these 
institutional problems, Bolivia’s lithium resources require more input than their neighbors’ as a result of 
their lower quality brines (higher magnesium contamination), and higher precipitation [52]. These changes 
cause the evaporation process to be more costly in addition to compounding logistical constraints [52]. 
Aware of potential supply changes, and as the world's largest global lithium consumer, China has recently 
(2019) invested in a $2.3 billion lithium project in Bolivia as a joint venture with the Bolivian state owned 
company YLB [53]. Enormous investments like these, that are somewhat independent of economics, and 
Bolivia's recent claims that the lithium rich salt flats now hold “ more than double a previous estimate” 
(Ramos 2019), make it difficult to analyze potential constraints from a resource perspective 
3.2 Cobalt Supply 
With high supply risks, cobalt is often at the forefront of discussions regarding sustainable 
development, but supply concerns might be overstated [8], [54]. While it is possible for demand to outpace 
reserves, policy decisions and technical changes will also shape the availability and need for cobalt. 
Månberger & Stenqvist (2018) concede that changing battery technology has the ability to reduce future 
cobalt needs, while Guirco et. al. (2019) warns that their energy scenario is “ambitious”, with a 100% 
renewable transport system by 2050.  
Calls for increased transparency are putting pressure on EV companies to source cobalt sustainably. 
Fortune’s crisis report, Blood, Sweat, and Batteries, and other investigations into child mining in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, have electric vehicle manufacturers announcing that they are looking for 





and China’s control cobalt refinement [9], [57], [58]. With over 65% of the world’s cobalt coming from the 
DRC, there is a strong reliance on the nation's ability to produce [59]. The DRC’s 3,400,000 tons of reserves 
are the largest in the world, but the U.S. Geological Survey also puts global terrestrial cobalt resources at 
25 million tons [9]. These concerns, among other factors, have caused price volatility for the metal, with 
prices dropping as much as 40% in the span of a few months [60]. As such, government incentives, technical 
changes, recycling, and alternative sources can all be used to offset potential shortages in the near future if 
necessary.  
3.3 Rare earth elements (REEs) 
The availability of rare earth elements (often-abbreviated REEs) is more nuanced than reserves and 
resources. The U.S. Geological Survey describes rare earth elements and metals as being relatively 
abundant in the Earth’s crust, although mineable/processable concentrations are limited and more nuanced 
[9], [61]. Yet, despite commonality, China was responsible for 70% of mine production in 2018, without 
accounting for illegal artisanal mining in the region [9]. Demand needs are further complicated by rare 
earths occurring with radioactive elements such as thorium. Joint production of rare earths also makes 
supply of each, and their relative prices, sensitive to changes in demand for the others. This secondary 
nature, with the exception of China’s clays and carbonatites, hinder the ability to accommodate rapid 
increases in demand, and makes the separation process environmentally burdensome. This difficulty in 
separating REE concentrates into usable elements allows for China to control 90% of the world’s refinement 
and processing capabilities along with90% of the world’s supply [62], [63]. However, China’s dominance 
of the market, and the precedent set by the 2010 rare earth trade dispute, have caused an increase in 
investment for rare earth projects outside of China. Although not at working capacity yet, partially owned 
by China, and not able to process REEs, the U.S. reopened its only rare earth mine in California in 2018 
[63]. There are also at least three U.S.-based companies with rare earth processing plants under construction 
or in the planning stages [63]. Australia is also implementing development deals to strengthen its production 
while trying to counter China’s dominance of the market [64], [65]. Further complications involving trade 
wars between the U.S. and China have raised questions regarding reliance on China for rare earth materials 
in the future, and what can be done to mitigate dependence [62], [66], [67]. Other developments including 
rare-earth recycling, the “tremendous potential of deep-sea mud as a source of rare-earth elements”(Takaya 
et al. 2018), and the U.S. Department of Energy’s multi-million dollar investments into recovering rare 
earth elements from combusted coal, illustrate a complexity that goes beyond direct supply shortages. 
3.4 Indium, Tellurium and Silver 
More than other technologies, the solar panel industry is often labeled as the most likely to be 
affected by material shortages [7], [14], [25], [32], [42]. Production concerns regarding indium and  
tellurium (for use in CIGS/CdTe) and silver have been specifically discussed, with claims that demand 
through 2050 may exceed current reserves (but not resources) for all three materials [14]. One of the key 
problems is that indium and tellurium are both secondary metals whose supply depends on growing demand 
for more common companion metals [68]. The World Bank’s 2017 report and  calls for resource governance 
to map minerals in developing nations, raise concerns on how reliable the data on these commodities are 
[2], [69]. As Indium was not recorded as being recovered at all in the United States for 2018, and 
quantitative estimates of reserves are not available for any country (although resources are), it is hard to 
judge its viability to respond to demand [9]. Therefore, flow rates are more important than reserves for 
secondary metals. Frenzel et al. (2017) go so far as to claim that indium production could increase by 300% 
without increasing zinc production, but the feasibility and economic viability of this increase has not been 
thoroughly assessed [70]. In the case of tellurium, the possibility of recovery from copper production, and 





commodity prices, large scale mining implementation, or adaptation by copper producers, might be able to 
mitigate shortages for numerous critical materials relating to PV technologies [9], [14]. Solar PV 
technologies also currently consume approximately 7% of end-use silver, and demand projections show 
panel requirements overtaking 70% of known reserves by 2050, although gold and silver mines account for 
a large portion of exploration projects [14], [32]. Further exploration of resources, end of life management, 
technical innovations, social constraints, environmental considerations, and general policy changes are 
most likely to determine the extent of solar PV material shortages [25]. 
 
4. Investment Strategies 
This section examines and compares national investment strategies regarding materials necessary for the 
energy transition. 
 
The nature of investments into the extraction and refinement of minerals will shape the speed and 
efficiency of the energy transition. The World Bank’s 2017 report on the growing role of minerals and 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s outlook on emerging markets both contend that “developing nations are 
today leading a global clean power transition” (BloombergNEF, 2018), with non-renewable mineral 
resources dominating energy production  in 81 countries [2], [71]. This outlook reflects the trend of 
developing countries advancing their material resources, but does not adequately consider the volatile role 
that larger economies will play in their development. The United States’ “commitment” to material security, 
China’s aggressive commercial diplomacy through the One Belt One Road initiative, and the possibility of 
material shortages all create unique investment challenges and opportunities across the world [62], [72]–
[75]. 
4.1 Chinese Investment 
Investigations into renewable energy investments in China revolve around the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI), China’s commitment to asset financing, and general control over mineral processing [63], 
[74], [76]. China’s clean energy policies and investment strategies mean that they have committed $758 
billion between 2010 and the first half of 2019, with the U.S. a distant second at $356 billion [77]. However, 
as both the largest investor in renewable energy and the world's largest polluter, China has been essential 
in the build-out of both solar and coal, adding more than 200 GW of each during the 2010s [77]. 
Independent scientific analysis by Climate Action Tracker shows that China is on track to meet its 2030 
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) and will likely achieve its 2020 pledge, but its actions are rated 
“Highly insufficient” and detrimental to carbon mitigation goals [78]. However, as the leader in renewable 
trends and investments, China’s commitment to securing material supply chains necessary for the energy 
transition, and its actions through the BRI, ensure that it will remain the leader in the changing energy 
sector. Policy briefings created by the Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Raw Materials for Europe 
(STRADE) conclude that mining asset acquisition is not central to the One Belt One Road initiative, and 
that “China is no longer ‘the dragon’ that is seeking to purchase global mineral assets” [79]. The Council 
on Foreign Relations instead describes China’s goals as being to foster general economic growth through 
the expansion of markets while creating a more assertive and essential China [73]. What is not discussed in 
many of these perspectives is that this framework of outward involvement, with infrastructure at its core, 





4.1.1 The Belt and Road Initiative 
A less exclusive continuation of China’s “Go Out2” international investment policy, the BRI is 
driven by China’s state owned enterprises (SOEs). STRADE’s 2018 European Policy Briefing reported that 
among the 50 most influential enterprises participating in the BRI, 42% are private enterprises, 56% are a 
type of SOE, and 2% are joint venture enterprises [79]. In the past, this use of state backed investments 
allowed for China to gain control of large portions of cobalt, platinum-group metals, and lithium reserves, 
as other nations struggled to incentivize multinational investment [80]. FP Analytics’ 2019 report Mining 
the Future accurately discusses the lasting implications of this approach, and how China is “set to dominate 
the next industrial revolution”, but does not explore the effects of the BRI initiative. This is possibly 
because, as STRADE points out, the BRI deals have no overarching structure, no membership protocols, 
no moralistic brow beatings, and no predefined set of standards [79]. Each country or bloc negotiates on 
their own terms, and deals can be structured in accordance with each set of particular parameters or 
development goals [81].  
Combined with a general lack of transparency through Chinese policy, there have not been adequate 
investigations into the development of the BRI and the materials of the energy transition [82]. STRADE’s 
European Policy brief went so far as to say that “declining interest in overseas metals and mining 
investment, particularly under the BRI can simply be a result of the lack of accurate data on Chinese 
investments” [79]. However, looking at infrastructure development projects in the past, especially in Africa, 
influences on supply should definitely be considered. The China Africa Research Initiative’s 2016 report 
on Chinese loans in Africa tried to dispel ideas that China has been solidifying its control over materials 
through loans to developing nations [82]. Yet, as Foreign Policy Analytics’ report discussed, China’s 
infrastructure investment in the DRC turned into ownership of 10 out of the DRC’s 18 major operational 
mines, six major development projects, a three-year off-take deal from the world’s largest cobalt mine, and 
influence over 52% of the country’s supply [80]. Furthermore, Bloomberg NEF’s report on emerging 
markets and the Council on Foreign Relations warn of potential debt traps, and that investments from the 
BRI can be considered a poisoned chalice [71], [83]. This is especially important when considering that 
CARI estimates 33% percent of Chinese loan finance in Africa is secured by commodities or exports of 
natural resources [71], [83]–[85]. The general level of investment in resource rich nations is shown in Figure 
8 [84].  
 
                                                     
2 Go Out policy is the People's Republic of China's strategy to encourage its enterprises to 












4.1.2 Refinement in China 
Beyond infrastructure development, China is adapting to the needs of market-oriented countries 
and solidify its role in the processing of critical materials. With control of international resources becoming 
increasingly difficult, trade and refinement agreements ensure that market control can be maintained. 
China’s $4.1 billion purchase of a 23.77 percent stake in Sociedad Química y Minera, a Chilean chemical 
and mining company, and China's Tianqi Lithium, which holds a 51% stake in Australia's Greenbushes 
lithium mine, ensures that they control over half the world's lithium production [85]–[87]. China’s more 
recent 49% stake in a $2.3 Billion planned venture with Bolivia’s state lithium company, YLB, will only 
increase lithium imports and refinement, especially if claims that Bolivia’s resources are the largest in the 





the largest lithium and lithium compound producers in the world, and help China to maintain its status as 
the world's largest producer of lithium batteries [19], [88]. This will likely continue, as Chinese government 
backed organizations can continue to make strategic long-term investments whereas privately owned 
corporations in the rest of the world maintain concerns about price volatility and returns.   
The European Union’s Study on the Review of the List of Critical Raw Materials (Table 1) shows 
that China is the major global supplier of 30 out of the 43 individual critical raw materials (as defined by 
the EU), despite a large majority of the materials being mined in other locations [8]. China’s ability to serve 
as a refinement crux is perhaps best expressed through their control of rare earth elements and cobalt. China 
is currently the largest importer of raw cobalt, accounting for 40% of global trade value, and is the world's 
leading producer of refined cobalt, the leading supplier of cobalt imports to the United States, and the 
leading consumer of cobalt [10]. Similarly, despite the opening of the rare earth mine in Mountain Pass, 
California (partially owned by China), the United States is reliant on China for 100 percent of its rare earth 
supply due to processing constraints [63], [89]. Furthermore, with China already being the destination of 
15 to 16 percent of sub-Saharan Africa’s exports, and the source of 14 to 21 percent of the region’s imports 
before the Belt and Road Initiative, it will likely maintain its control over a large portion of numerous 
material markets [83]. This control, and use of large scale vertical integration, allows for it to be the largest 
seller of electric vehicles, the largest producer of wind turbines, and home to the three largest solar module 




















Figure 9: Global supply of Critical Raw Materials  
The 15 rare earth elements (REE) are split into two sub-categories based on their chemical and physical 
properties – ‘heavy’ rare earth elements (HREE) , consisting of ten individual materials, and ‘light’ rare  
earth elements (LREE), comprising five individual materials. The five platinum group metals (excluding 
osmium) (PGMs) are also grouped. (European Commission 2017)[8] 
 
4.2 United States Investment 
This section examines US investment strategies of the United States through its role as the world's largest 
economy and as a contrast to Chinese strategies.   
4.2.1 Substitutions 
Investments in material supply chains for the United States have primarily focused on technical 
advancements and have yet to reach the level of involvement required to maximize their benefit from the 
energy transition. The United States began to develop their critical material strategy in 2010 directly 
focusing on emerging clean energy technologies following China’s REE export dispute in the same year 





manufacturing here in the United States”, and even discussed future demand projections for renewable 
energy technologies [93]. The impact of the initiative is unclear, and after 2011 the Department of Energy 
awarded $120 million to the Critical Materials Institute (CMI) to “assure supply chains of materials critical 
to clean energy technologies” [94]. The CMI has made advancements in critical material substitutions, but 
as their orientation is purely technical in nature, they have not actively incentivized investment or the 
exploration of resources like China has [95]. In the following years, the United States government invested 
heavily in the recovery of REE from coal and coal byproducts [96]. Recent advancements have prompted 
a further investment of $20 million for “Process Scale-Up and Optimization/Efficiency Improvements” for 
the Department of Energy-National Energy Technology Laboratory Rare Earth Element Program in April 
of 2019 [96]. The impact of these substitutes will likely prove substantial in future supply concerns, as 
Sprecher et. al’s 2017 study on critical materials showed the positive impact of substitutes for rare earth 




Figure 10: Rare Earth production following 2010 Chinese export restrictions 
(Sprecher et al. 2017)[97] 
 
4.2.2 Goals for Mineral Independence 
Following an executive order in 2018, the United States created the Federal Strategy to Ensure 
Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals with the intention of progressing toward mineral 
independence [72]. With a call to action, this strategy solidifies objectives put forth in the United States’ 
first critical materials strategy, with the additional goals of aiding in the cataloging of possible resources, 
permitting and leasing on federal land, and the growing of the relative American workforce [72]. Although 
this appears to address a few investment concerns, particularly regarding necessary workforces, it does not 
present many actionable objectives regarding supply chains. The strategy’s narrative is broad in scope and, 
beyond stating policy, it is unclear what monetary incentives or actions it contributes to accomplish its 
goals. This disconnect between the strategy and implementation, or supply and investment, is a major gap 
in the United States’ goal to limit its heavy import reliance (Figure 11).  
Since it may take a decade or more to open a mine, the United States’ lack of investments in new 
mining operations can create problems if faced with increases in production or rapid commitment to 
renewable energy [45]. The 2017 U.S. Geological Survey’s Exploration Review shows a “recovery for 





focus towards projects with short-term development [98]. The report also warns of a 13% decline in 
exploration companies headquartered in Australia, Canada, and the United States, and only 20% of active 
exploration sites having mineral targets other than gold, silver, and base metals [98].  Investment in 
California’s Mountain Pass mine, the United States’ sole rare earth mine, is often praised despite it only 
being pulled out of bankruptcy in 2017. The site also has an idle $300,000,000 building that the company 
calls the “crack house” from its previous mismanagement [99]. MP Mine Operations LLC, the owner of 
the mine (along with Chinese partner Leshan Shenghe Rare Earth Co.), say they are “literally going around 
shutting off lights” due to the tariff on rare-earth ore shipments to China, resulting from the Trump 
administration's own tariffs [89]. Plans to open rare earth processing plants in the United States are 
progressing, with the first set to open in 2020, but other efforts are still in the early stages and would likely 
only process locally extracted rare earth compounds [63], [64]. The 2019 USGS commodity summary on 
rare earths shows that the United States’ mine production was only 15,000 tons of the 170,000 produced 
globally, all of which was processed in China [9]. As such, in 2018 the United States had a 100% net import 
reliance and imported an estimated $160 million worth of rare-earth compounds and metals; an increase 
from $137 million in 2017 [9].  
According to Bloomberg NEF’s emerging markets outlook, administrative actions in the United 
States have lead to instability concerns and broader difficulties for investment in emerging markets [71]. 
Although these actions could lead to greater investment in the United States’ own mining industry, 
administrative actions have shown that supporting these types of investment are not a priority for the current 
administration, especially in regards to preparing for a low-carbon economy. Combined with uncertainty 
about the effects of federal tax reform legislation and new import tariffs, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
surrounding general investments in materials and technologies necessary for low-carbon energy. Because 
of this, relevant investments are primarily driven by actions at the state and private level. Deloitte’s 
Renewable Energy Industry Outlook for 2019 cites that over the past two decades, nearly 50 percent of 
U.S. wind and solar development was driven by state mandates, especially renewable portfolio standards, 
and that many corporations headquartered in the United States have committed to achieving 100 percent 
renewable power as part of the RE100 campaign  [100].  
Investment into clean energy development in the United States rose 12% to $64.2 billion in 2018 
due to state involvement, but the lack of clear federal policy and federal investment into mapping mineral 
resources is likely to create problems in the future. Insights by Sykes et al. (2016) on transformational 
change in the critical materials market warns that the recognition of future potential demand will not be 
enough to incentivize growth [101]. The economic history of mining and metal markets show that a 
combination of breakthroughs in discovery, supply, and demand factors will all be required for 
transformative growth [101]. Similarly, Koning et al. (2018) warns that major issues with demand-supply 
imbalances and price hikes will occur if policies are unexpectedly and widely adopted, causing a much 
faster transition to low-carbon technologies and electric vehicles [45]. This scenario is becoming 
increasingly likely, as the transition to renewable energy will occur in spite of the U.S. government’s 
commitment to coal and scrubbing of climate change data from federal websites [102]. This level of passive 
investment creates uncertainty and volatility due to the United States being one of the world's largest 
economies, and one of the nations most confused about its own climate policy. 






Figure 11: 2018 U.S. Net Import Reliance  







5. Environment, Governance, Society, and Artisanal Mining 
In this section, the impact of environmental and climate concerns, governance, and artisanal mining 
are examined in the context of material supply considerations.  
 
As mineral resources begin to play a larger role in the energy transition, it is important to examine 
the role that local communities will have on improving the sustainability of mining practices and the 
reliability of supply. As described in the World Bank’s 2017 overview of extractive industries, 
nonrenewable mineral resources play a dominant role in 81 countries that collectively account for a quarter 
of world GDP, half of the world's population, and nearly 70 percent of those in extreme poverty [103]. The 
2017 Resource Governance Index (RGI) and the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) found that 
of countries monitored, 42 percent of mineral reserves are in countries with “good” or “satisfactory” 
governance scores, 37 percent are in countries with “weak” scores, and a further 7 percent are in countries 
that score “poor” [104]. The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) maintains that the 
way materials are sourced will determine whether the energy transition supports peaceful, sustainable 
development, or exacerbate local tensions and grievances [3]. The implications of this can be seen in Figure 
12, where many of the resource rich areas such as North-Eastern Africa, and parts of South America, are 
rated as relatively fragile or corrupt. States with high scores were rated worse on 12 different indicators 
including human rights, public services, demographic pressures, refugees and internally displaced persons, 
and security. The effects of these relationships are sometimes discussed in the context of investment risks, 
such as in reports put out by Bloomberg NEF, but the scope of their potential influence has not been well 
defined outside of the mining industry [71]. With increasing demand, mining projects in developing 
countries have become more commercially attractive, and this new interest can lead to potential issues with 
supply disruption through environmental damage, corruption, and local conflicts. 
 
 
Figure 12: Fragile States Index 
(Fragile States Index.)[105] 
 
5.1 Environmental Concerns 
Environmental concerns and questions about the climate footprint of the materials necessary for 
the energy transition are only beginning to be properly discussed by policymakers despite environmental 





technologies and their materials to ensure that they make net positive contributions to the fight against 
climate change. Pollutants (tailings, emissions, and other physical wastes) from extraction and processing 
account for half the world's worst ranked industries and are responsible for many of the most toxic locations 
on Earth [106]. Non-profit PureEarth (formerly the Blacksmith Institute) reports that 92% of pollution 
related deaths occur in low and middle income countries [107]. While these deaths are sometimes the result 
of uncommon, negligent mining practices, the Natural Resource Governance Institute is warning that 
accountability may start to be outweighed by potential material profits in nations with poor governance 
scores [104]. The implications of this lack of accountability can be seen in Zhiyuan Li’s 2014 investigation 
of heavy metal pollution in areas surrounding Chinese mines [108]. The investigation gives detailed 
descriptions about the overall pollution levels and health risks posed by heavy metals in the soils of various 
mining areas throughout China, which are only expected to get worse [108]. Similarly, the parts of Zambia 
and the DRC that host the Central African Copperbelt are considered one of the top ten most polluted areas 
in the world as a result of the discharge of pollutants from mines and smelters [109]. A general lack of 
accountability in this area has led to heavy metal contamination of air, water, soil and plants with heavy 
metals and lasting health impacts [18], [108]. Along with health issues for miners and surrounding 
communities, these changes can lead to conflict with local populations. Another example of this is 
Australian based company Lynas Corp., one of the only REE suppliers in the world, which lost half of its 
stock value during 2018-2019 after concerns arose regarding low-level radioactive waste generated by its 
refinement plant in Malaysia [110]. 
Research on greenhouse gas emission disclosure from the minerals sector also highlights the scale 
of climate impacts from mineral companies and their supply chains, and how difficult supply chain 
emissions in particular are to capture [111]. Even among semi-responsible international entities, the ability 
to consistently trace emissions along the supply chain remains largely out of reach, making it challenging 
to set and track climate goals and develop procurement strategies for low-carbon minerals. With low global 
accountability, and an increase in scale with global supply chains, carbon emissions have the potential to 
become much worse in the coming years and need to be better understood to reach carbon goals. 
 
5.2 Conflict Minerals and Human Rights Abuses 
Regional conflicts and human rights abuses stemming from mineral extraction/markets are not new, 
but are also not often envisioned by policymakers as possible consequences of the low-carbon future. The 
International Institute for Sustainable Development’s (IISD) 2018 report Green Conflict Minerals provides 
an overview of what minerals are at risk of becoming “fuels” for conflict in the upcoming transition, and 
lays a foundation for how dissemination of information and sourcing transparency can mitigate risks and 
conflicts [3]. However, while IISD’s strategy involves supporting and engaging local communities in 
meaningful ways, many mitigation efforts rely heavily on civil society groups, the private sector, and 
governments acting as “watchdogs” who only try to limit involvement in these troubled areas [3]. This off-
limits sourcing approach is based on incomplete understandings of root causes and often preempts a de 
facto boycott of all minerals even where there is no conflict at the time. Autesserre (2012) explores the 
consequences of off-limits, narrative driven intervention by showing that while simple cause & effect 
stories are necessary for policy makers, journalists, and advocacy groups, they create limitations and have 
a number of “perverse effects” [112]. In focusing overwhelmingly on technical responses and acting only 
through legislation and materials markets, other causes, consequences, and comprehensive solutions are 
often ignored [112].  
Independent investigations into the 2010 Dodd-Frank act, which was intended to reduce the use of 
conflict fueling minerals, have found “conflict-free” legislation can sometimes be unintentionally 
detrimental to many of the mining communities they are trying to protect [55], [57], [113]–[115]. Due to 
concentrated narratives on how armed groups were able to fund their activities, the Dodd-Frank act was 





targeting resources from the DRC (tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold), the legislation inadvertently created 
a de facto ban on artisanal mining that deprived hundreds of thousands of Congolese of their livelihoods 
[55], [57], [113]–[115], [117]. Furthermore, an investigation by Stoop et al. (2018) concluded that the 
legislation actually caused an increase in violence, in both the short and long term, since armed groups 
compensated their income losses by roving the countryside and increasing battles over gold mines [117]. 
As a result, an open letter was written and signed by over 70 Congolese and international academic 
observers arguing that the campaign fundamentally misunderstood the relationship between minerals and 
conflict in the eastern DRC [113]. 
 While the results of Dodd-Frank are not representative of all conflict minerals initiatives or 
sustainable supply chain commitments, there is a disconnect between many renewable energy industries 
and the understanding of their impacts. Industry experts interviewed for the ISF’s report Responsible 
Minerals Sourcing for Renewable Energy plainly stated that “reducing the environmental and social impacts 
of supply is not a major focus of the renewable energy industry” [18]. Amnesty International's 2016 
investigation into corporate action and cobalt supply chains reported that all 26 companies failed to conduct 
human rights due diligence in line with international standards [118]. The 2017 repeal of a U.S. SEC rule 
requiring mining companies to disclose payments made to governments for access to natural resources, and 
a general history of human rights abuses from Chinese mining companies, show a continuation of the 
“material first” attitude of market economies [119], [120]. As Sovacool (2019) points out, improving the 
political economy of minerals in developing nations is a multidimensional and multi-institutional process 
that underscores the necessity of a diffuse chain of actors—including governments, technology firms, and 
consumers—accepting their own responsibility in the plight of the people involved [121]. Once 
corporations become more than passively involved in impacts they are having on material exporting nations, 
and consumers become fully aware of what their choices entail, then policy can be enacted that is perhaps 
both broader, but also more effective. 
5.3 Artisanal Miners and Local Communities  
The role of local communities and artisanal miners is evolving into an essential part of resource 
management. Artisanal or small-scale mining (ASM) is often viewed as a subset or side effect of larger 
mining operations, but in actuality it is an essential part of life for millions of people in developing nations. 
In 2009, an estimated 5–20% of the African population directly depended on ASM, with more recent 
estimates shown in Figure 13 [122]. In 2013, The World Bank reported that 100 million people were directly 
engaged in artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) compared to the 7 million people working in industrial 
mining in 2013 [122], [123]. With such high employment rates, ASM is believed to account for 15 to 20% 
of global non-fuel mineral production, and was estimated at one point to add 40% to official Chinese 
production of the REE [122], [124]. By having such a large impact on local communities and mining 
industries, the benefits of formalizing ASM go beyond integration and should be viewed as an essential 
part of mitigating supply chain instability and environmental concerns. In working with ASM communities, 
independent mining operations can operate within safe and effective supply chains and stop many of the 
negative environmental impacts associated with the toxic, low-cost practices often resorted to by ASM 
communities.   
The World Bank's 2007 collaborative report on artisanal mining in the DRC documented how 
mining and mineral extraction can involve multiple pollution sources and pathways. In the DRC in 
particular, the Work Bank noted how mining and mineral extraction can pollute through drainage at mining 
sites, direct dumping of mine waste, sediment runoff, pollution from mining dredging in river beds, mercury 
pollution, chemical spills, sewage flows, and air emissions. Ditsele and Awuah-Offei (2012) also shows 
that large-scale operations tend to have lower life cycle environmental impacts than smaller operation, and 
because of the informal nature of ASM, governments do not often know of the existence of operations and 







Figure 13: Estimated number of artisanal and small-scale miners as percentage of rural population 
(artisanalmining.org )[126] 
 
5.4 Social Concerns  
 Mineral extraction does not only present environmental and regional governance concerns, it can 
also result in social issues such as exploitation, gender inequality, and child labor. For example, Marysse 
and Geenen (2009) report that Congolese trade agreements with China enable Chinese firms to buy at prices 
below world market levels [127].  Mohan and Power (2008) thus caution that mineral extraction will not 
fundamentally challenge Africa’s extroverted relationship with the world economy. This unequal 
relationship keeps it at a perpetual disadvantage and locked into supplying raw materials to global markets, 
rather than adding value to its local economies [128]. De Haan and Geenen (2016) also noted that mining 
cooperatives, intended to support local miners, have in one other sector (South Kivu) done the opposite and 
become tools furthering the exploitation of miners at the hands of the elite [129].  
Hinton et al. (2013) indicates that many of the health impacts from mining are gendered, with 
women facing additional illness, injury, and stress as well as extreme exertion and exhaustion from very 
labor-intensive activities (i.e., digging for several hours, hauling heavy loads long distances, bending over 
in awkward positions) more than men [130]. Tsurukawa et al. (2011) noted that women in mining 
communities face the ever present risk of contracting dangerous diseases being spread by miners and 
migrants, including diarrhea, hepatitis, meningitis, bilharziosis, cholera, typhoid, tetanus, typhus, malaria, 
yellow fever, tuberculosis, musculoskeletal disorders, respiratory disorders and headaches [131]. Moreover, 
the fact that many forms of ASM are nomadic in nature adds stress to family routines and structures, with 
women often having to take care of children, orphans, the elderly, and widows in addition to their mining 
activities [132]. 
Child labor can also be associated with mining. Amnesty International documented child mining 
in the DRC and noted that many children drop out of school, and/or are driven by family poverty, to mine 
for cobalt [118]. Children work in the open, in high temperatures, in the rain, and they report falling sick 
and “hurting all over” [118].  The International Labor Organization (ILO) even classified child mining for 
cobalt as one of the “worst forms of child labor,” given that it: 
 
• Exposes children to physical and at times psychological and sexual abuse; 
• Requires working underground, underwater, at dangerous heights, or in confined spaces; 





• Places children in unhealthy work environments that expose children to toxic substances, agents, 
and processes; 
• Necessitates difficult conditions including working for long hours or at night 
 
Often children will carry sacks of ore that weigh more than they do and are also exposed to physical abuse 
and beatings, whippings, and attempted drownings from security guards. They are also exposed to drug 
abuse, violence, and sexual exploitation. Children also reported being financially exploited by traders and 
bosses who refused to even weigh their products, and instead paid substandard and below market rates for 
sacks of cobalt based on visually estimated weights. The World Bank (2007) writes that while some children 
may be paid in cash, they are “most often cheated and some are not paid to work, but to simply survive 
while receiving only basic sustenance as payment.”[123] 
 
5.4 Water 
Water considerations are likely to be one of the largest environmental barriers, as water scarcity is 
a major barrier to the development of material resources across the world. The International Council of 
Mining and Metals and the International Finance Corporation have both released a report regarding the 
increasingly important role of water in the mining sector, especially in newer, remote locations [133]. 
Multiple mining executives have given warnings that assets will be stranded and investors will walk away 
unless they deal with water scarcity in key mining regions such as Africa, Australia, and Latin America 
[134], [135]. Northey et al. (2017) expands on the global interaction between the mining industry and water 
resources to show that minerals like copper are generally located in regions where water consumption is 
more likely to long term decrease in water availability [136]. The U.S. Geological Survey’s annual 
exploration review also warns that competing demands for energy and water has increased risks related to 
energy and water investment and limited growth [98]. This is especially troubling as ore grades continue to 
decline with mining explorations taking place in more remote locations. In response, the mining sector in 
Australia, Canada, Chile and South Africa have increased their focus on increasing access and developing 
new techniques for using desalinated water and renewable energy sources in order to reduce energy 
consumption and adopt more sustainable energy sources [98]. 
 
6. Resource Efficiency and a Circular Economy 
In this section, the role of technical changes in the recycling and extractive industries are explored. 
 
Changes in the mining and recycling industries need to be better understood as they will have large 
impacts on the primary resources needed for the renewable energy transition. Reports on the supply and 
demand scenarios for various temperature mitigation goals state that the exact materials and quantities 
necessary for the energy transition are dependent on what technologies become popular or more efficient 
[2], [3], [18]. Despite attempts to limit ambiguity with only basic demand assumptions and multiple climate 
scenarios, technical changes regarding the sourcing of metals and minerals are not often discussed in the 
same context as demand needs. With concerns over sudden increases in mineral demand, and exploration 
projects becoming “more costly and difficult to develop” (USGS 2018), the nature of the mining and 
recycling industries are becoming increasingly important [98]. Mining reports on business risks by Ernst & 
Young Global Limited and Deloitte both see technical change as a strategic priority for its role as an enabler 
across every facet of the business [137], [138]. As such, the ability to develop technologies that utilise 
abundant metals, aid in primary extraction, improve metal intensity, and/or increase recycling will 






6.1 Recycling and Resource Efficiency 
The recycling of metals from end-of-life products can improve the future availability of critical 
materials, but data on its feasibility is often lacking and needs to be researched [2]. With questions regarding 
life-cycle and recoverability, many of these technologies have not yet proven to be economically viable in 
comparison to existing extraction sites. One of the arguments presented by Ali et al. (2017) for resource 
governance revolves around secondary metal production and the role of recycling in the future. Of particular 
concern is the potential period when primary metal production may stumble before the infrastructure for 
secondary metal production will allow recycling to contribute on a meaningful level (Figure 14) [69]. Tilton 
et al. (2018) claim that price increases for materials can quickly offset recycling shortfalls, but also advocate 
for R&D, as innovations alone offer the possibility of keeping mineral depletion at bay indefinitely. 
               
 
Figure 14: Schematic transition towards a circular economy for minerals and metals. 
(Ayuk et al. 2019)[139] 
 
Watari et al.’s (2018) claim that recycling can reduce primary demand by 20%~70% for low carbon 
energy technology is especially relevant when seen in the context of time needed to research and understand 
recycling challenges [32]. The diverse set of technologies and unknown material mixes makes high 
recycling rates difficult to obtain for all of the metals included. A disparity between metals contained in 
technologies reaching their end of life, and what is demanded in new technologies, is also likely to exist in 
the future. USGS’s most recent Minerals Yearbook: Recycling Statistics and Information shows that the 
United States recycled 59.0 million metric tons (Mt) of selected metals, an amount equivalent to 51% of 
the apparent supply, but only 1% of REE’s from end-life products [140]. Jowitt et al. (2018) discusses the 
unrealized potential of recycling of the REE and how it is possible to alleviate some criticality of certain 
materials, albeit with extensive research [141]. Institutions such as the Critical Materials Institute have been 
doing said research and have already won, among other achievements, a Notable Technology Development 
Award for their acid-free dissolution rare-earth magnet recycling process [37]. Similarly, the National 
Energy Technology Laboratory’s program to recover REE from coal and coal byproducts is already 
working to scale-up and optimize their extraction methods [96]. Start-up companies like Li-Cycle have 





research into recycling silver, cobalt, and lithium can prove just as valuable, with the effects on production 
shown in Figure 15. 
 
  
Figure 15: Annual demand from renewable energy and storage technologies in 2050 compared with 
current production rates (note that scale varies across the metals) (Giurco et al. 2019)[7] 
 
 
6.2 Innovations in Mining Technology 
The ability of the mining industry to meet supply needs is highly dependent on mining technology, 
as innovations serve to offset the downsizing in the global mining industry while helping to secure 
investments [138]. S&P Global’s 2019 report on metals and mining trends warns that they expect prices to 
remain volatile, with fluctuations likely related to developments in China and potentially other government 
policies and geopolitical risks [143]. The resulting balance sheet conservatism can delay future responses 
to increases in demand, and do not preclude a flexible and adaptive mining industry [69]. The USGS’s 2017 
annual exploration review claimed that 2017 marked a global recovery from the trend of decreasing 
exploration budgets that were reported for 2012-2016, but also claimed that many exploration projects are 
becoming increasingly more costly and difficult to develop [98]. The depletion of shallow, known deposits 
has driven exploration companies to remote areas with limited infrastructure, which can create new 
concerns [98]. 
 Deloitte and EY Global Limited have both compiled lists aiding to identify the necessary trends 
for growth to offset these challenges and emphasize that the mining industry is in position for a technology-
enabled transformation [137], [138]. As reported by McKinsey and Company, advanced analytics, 
autonomous equipment, and artificial intelligence can help to improve upon the modest 2.8% increase in 
mining productivity from 2014-2016 [144].  At the same time, finding qualified workers to fuel this 
transition is a problem, as outlined in The United States’ Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable 
Supplies of Critical Minerals [72]. According to the strategy, the mining industry faces a wide array of 
challenges including an aging and retiring workforce and faculty; a decrease in mining, mineral 
engineering, and economic geology programs; negative perceptions with respect to the nature of the work; 
and foreign competition for U.S. talent [72].  These shortcomings once again lead back to Tilton et al. 
(2018) calling for government intervention to address externalities regarding education, and how important 
adaptability is for the future [50]. 
 Further seeking to offset some of these trends, the Columbia Center’s report The Renewable Power 
of the Mine advocates for the integration of renewable technology to offset expenses, reduce the carbon 
footprint of mining operations, and update the technical level of operation [145]. As electricity needs can 





installations, can aid in making mining more profitable and attractive to investors while aiding to reduce 
carbon footprints [145]. This is especially relevant as the GHG emissions from mining operations become 
more of a concern with higher demands and varied results from life-cycle analyses [111], [146]. The 
Thabazimbi mine in South Africa used solar integration in 2013 and was able to break even after only 3.6 
years [145]. Other similar projects across the world and the “greening of the mines” present opportunities 
for sustainability and the attracting of a newer, technology-driven workforce. 
However, despite potentially game changing initiatives and goals, it is not clear how the mining 
industry will handle dramatically rising material needs. The U.S. Geological Survey’s most recent 
exploration review shows that gold and silver still accounted for the majority of active exploration sites, 
and that the renewable materials market is not a priority [98]. Sector wide discussion is likely needed to 
plan for these magnitude sized increases in demand for various scenarios, while government intervention 
will also likely be necessary to aid in addressing knowledge externalities.  
 
6.3 Processing Technology 
The mining and refining sectors will also have to innovate and target new sources to meet demand 
for materials in the renewable energy transition. Mudd et al. (2017) show that there are likely to be 
significant volumes of tailings and mine waste that represent potential sources of critical and other metals 
[147]. Innovations to current processing efficiencies and recoveries could also produce more from existing 
supply chains, especially in terms of minor by-product capture. With this in mind, input data (anode 
composition) was collected from 30 refineries from 2014-2018, which produced 37% of the world’s electro-
refined copper, and were analyzed to calculate by-product potential [72], [148]. Table 2 summarizes the 
estimated world by-product potential in copper anodes of critical minerals and compares the potential to 
world production [148]. It is clear that processing innovations could unlock significant production of 
selenium, tellurium and bismuth from the existing copper supply chain, and that other such changes can 
also have meaningful impacts. 
 
Table 1: . Estimation of critical mineral potential in the world’s copper supply chain 
Critical Mineral [##] Estimated Potential in Copper Anodes (ton/year) World Production (ton/year) 
Selenium 8300 3300  
Tellurium 2200 420  
Bismuth               4900 14000  
Antimony 6200 150000  
 






7. Markets and Modeling  






The assumed availability of mineral commodities during the energy transition is often simplified 
instead of contextualized through a framework of supply chain considerations. Cumulative demand 
scenarios presented in mineral reports, such as Growing Role of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon 
Future, Responsible Minerals Sourcing for Renewable Energy, Requirements for Minerals and Metals for 
100% Renewable Scenarios, show possible market failures where demand is routinely positioned to exceed 
production trends [2], [7], [18]. This disconnect has resulted in Ali et al. (2017) and others to call for 
resource governance as a means to “reach consensus on international targets for global mineral production” 
[69]. While an important paradigm shift from literature investigating life-cycles and energy return on 
investment, the focus on supply and demand lends itself to an alarmist attitude. The nature of energy 
security requires considering dozens of variables that impact material needs and an awareness of multiple 
points of failure along supply chains [149].  
Externalities corresponding to the energy transition, including sustainable mineral production, 
manufacturing efficiency, recycling, and the research/education necessary for substitutes, are especially 
important considerations and should always be discussed in conjunction with supply needs. From a market 
oriented perspective, Tilton et al. (2018) attempt to rebuke “pessimistic” views about material scarcity by 
contesting that “shortages are temporary and do not pose a serious long-run threat to human welfare” [150]. 
Tilton et al.’s (2018) comparison of the energy transition to “peak oil” and reminders that higher prices 
“foster supply and curb demand” might appear passive, but they also acknowledge that government 
intervention is needed to address serious market failures such as environmental policy and research into 
recycling. ISF’s report explicitly states that demand from renewable energy and storage technologies could 
exceed reserves for various minerals, but its’ “key intervention points” responsibly revolve around 
recycling and awareness of sustainable sourcing [18]. Similarly, while Månberger & Stenqvist (2018) found 
lithium and cobalt reserves to be incompatible with the IEA’s B2D scenario, they conclude that those 
considering a metals criticality should “focus more on how to reduce vulnerability by developing 
technologies that utilize abundant metals, improve metal intensity and/or increase recycling” and that 
metals may be perceived as more critical in the medium to long-term today than is actually the case if 
policies that reduce vulnerabilities are implemented [11].  
Further considerations that highlight the complexity of markets and externalities are presented in 
analysis of rare earth markets by Sprecher et al. (2015, 2017) following the 2010 REE crisis. The United 
States sole rare earth supplier, Molycorp, despite having a $6 billion dollar market evaluation, filed for 
bankruptcy in 2015 due to the popularity of rare earth alternatives and the easing of China’s export rules, 
both of which caused a rapid decrease in REE prices [151], [152]. Sprecher et al. (2017) found that annual 
substitution rates reached 10% of total demand, while non-Chinese primary production increased only at a 
speed of 4% of total market volume per year [97]. Subsequently, “recovery” from the disruption only took 
two years, and the crisis was unable to induce an appreciable degree of recycling. This disconnect implies 
that sustained material constraints might be decisive in the passive implementation of circular economies 
and internalization of some externalities [97]. 
For actual material needs, the uncertainty of future technology makes demand predictions better at 
identifying trends than exact quantities. Månberger & Stenqvist (2018) caution that technological 
development has previously enabled metal intensities to improve, and that historical estimates of 
technologies maturing to the point of no further improvement have been wrong (although not always) [11]. 
Grubler et al. (2016) and Sovacool (2016) further highlight this uncertainty by discussing the complex 
nature of measuring what exactly an energy transition entails and how long it can take [153]. With these 
uncertainties, demand predictions are not meant to act as explicit guides to the transition. Cumulative 
demand ranges of ≈24,000 tons - 700,000 tons for silver are not at all indicative of uncertainty or bad 
modeling but, as the report states, are supposed to “engender a broader dialogue between the mining and 
metals constituency and the climate change and clean energy community” [2]. The intrinsic ambiguity of 





more difficult to estimate a forward price curve for lithium that for crude oil [154]. This uncertainty makes 
investment decisions by market participants, as well as research, difficult. As such, the United Nations’ 
proposal for Mineral Resource Governance in the 21st Century is a much stronger approach than calls for 
“material quotas” and production goals. Instead of trying to understand a multitude of ever changing 
variables, the UN proposal, and the World Bank’s 2017 report, suggests strengthening businesses, 
industries, and governments so that they can be adequately prepared to adjust for material needs as they 
develop. This adaptability occurs through not only increased transparency, but also through relevant 
government policies. Not only does this allow for healthy development across multiple sectors, but is also 
one of the only ways to ensure that material needs are adapted to appropriately instead of 
over/underestimated.  
 
8. Policy Pathways and Global Political Trends  
In this section, geopolitical trends regarding the nature of the energy transition and their potential impact 
on supply chains are explored. 
 
The geopolitical considerations of renewable energy have not been commonly investigated despite 
the far-reaching influence of material supply chains and future energy needs. IRENA’s report on the 
geopolitics of the energy transition lays the technical foundation for how the transition will cause 
disruptions, especially in regards to fossil fuel flows and renewable energy technology, but doesn’t focus 
on the implications of already enacted policy and strategy [4]. With the multifaceted nature of the energy 
transition, it is worth examining both the larger implications of the political shifts, and the smaller 
legislative trends that are already aiding in geopolitical changes. Bazilian et al. (2019) explores four possible 
geopolitical trajectories for the energy transition. Using these “Four Futures” (Figure 16) as a lens, 
examinations of corruption, conflict, and trade can be used to better understand the political challenges of 







Figure 16: Four global low-carbon futures 
(Bazilian et al. 2019)[155] 
8.1 The Big Green Deal 
A “Big Green Deal” scenario, with a concerted international policy drive, aligns well with the Paris 
Agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, but might not be the scenario the world 
is building towards. The ‘bottom up’ structure of the Paris Climate Agreement, requesting that all parties 
“put forward their best efforts”, succeeded in adoption, but cannot ensure that the appropriate material 
policies are being built [1]. The United States internalized approach to energy and rejection of anything that 
might obstruct development, including limits on GHG emission, (Executive Order 13783), is one of many 
nationalistic energy trends that will likely cause material disruptions and prevent the adoption of a “Big 
Green Deal” [156], [157]. President Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Accord came with the justification 
that the accord would cost the United States “$3 trillion in lost GDP and 6.5 million industrial jobs”[158] 
while giving China and India a political edge in energy. This perspective is not indicative of appropriate 
acknowledgment of externalities and instead highlights a problem raised by Tilton et al. (2018), where 
“private firms cannot be expected to curtail their pollution to socially optimal levels unless public policy 
requires their competitors to do the same” [150]. From a low-carbon materials perspective, this means that 
the nations like the United States are not moving towards decarbonization by adequately investing in the 
technologies and material supply chains that will let them operate successfully in the low carbon future. 
The Big Green Deal, which is a best-case scenario for many nations, becomes increasingly difficult to 
achieve as mining operations, recycling programs, and policy driven change have less time to take effect 
and enact the change necessary to successfully accommodate material demand and an optimal low-carbon 
transition. 
 
8.2 Muddling On 
  Indicative of the “muddling on” future, a lack of focus on critical material supply chains, and their 
environmental and social implications, only slows down a nation's ability to adapt a beneficial renewable 
energy strategy. China leads the world in renewable energy investment, with $126.6 billion in 2017, but the 
China Global Energy Finance database shows that coal projects accounted for up to 42% of China's overseas 
investment in 2018 [159], [160]. China’s control of renewable markets while being involved in hundreds 
of coal projects in other countries (BRI) is even counterproductive to reducing material vulnerabilities for 
other nations. The implementation of low-efficiency coal plants passes structured, monetary risks onto 
developing countries and limits their ability to enact policies focusing on recycling, material development, 
metal use [161]. A report by Carbon Tracker claims that 40% of China’s coal power stations are already 
losing money, and that the number could rise to 95% by 2040 due to the cost of complying with air pollution 
regulations and a rising carbon price [162]. As the coal plants China is building in other nations are of even 
worse quality, this is a troubling trend [161]. Financial implications are reflected by the Institute for Energy 
Economics and Financial Analysis’ estimates that US$150 billion of asset impairments have been incurred 
by European utilities over the period 2010-2016 for not anticipating renewable energy trends [162], [163]. 
This investment into depreciating assets and high-carbon energy can only be seen as a step backwards when 
considering what changes need to be enacted for a low-carbon future. The loss of capital is significant when 
considering the time scale necessary to open mines, international trading routes, create entire recycling 






8.3 Dirty Nationalism 
Calls by the United Nations Environment Programme for adaptable resource governance as a way 
to aid developing nations and mitigate the shocks of future supply are well founded when considering 
nationalistic trends exhibited by some of the world’s largest economies [139]. Gaps in mapping relevant 
mineral/metal resources and the disconnect between production activities and reserve levels are especially 
relevant for nations that are part of the BRI, as they are subject to large risks [2], [69]. However, China’s 
Development Research Center reminds the world that, as a major producer and the world’s largest consumer 
and trader of resources, “there is no global resource governance without China” [164]. Together, this 
mentality, US-China trade wars, and rising nationalism make cooperative transitions increasingly difficult 
to achieve and “dirty nationalist” increasingly likely [161], [165], [166].  
International competition for limited resources can create material shortages and policy related, 
ethical considerations for the energy transition. IRENA’s description of the shift to renewables as a “energy 
transformation” is especially apt when reminded that “fossil fuels have been the foundation of the global 
energy system, economic growth, and modern lifestyles” [4]. With the rise of renewable energy, each 
nation’s ability to adapt to the transition depends on how exposed they are to changes in fossil fuel trades 
and their position in the clean energy race (Figure 17) [4]. Therefore, the ”dirty nationalism” future see 
tensions rising between groups who seek to control the markets and materials needed for the energy 
transition. The formation of cartels in the vein of OPEC are a very real possibility, but can also be mitigated 
by the development of resources in varied countries. Concerned with the alliances China is making through 
the Belt and Road Initiative, the United States has already passed the BUILD Act in 2018 to help 
“developing countries prosper while advancing U.S. foreign policy goals and enhancing U.S. national 
security interests” [167]. China’s restriction of rare earths in 2010 after the Senkaku boat collision incident 
set precedent on how supply and control of these critical resources can be leveraged [168]. Critical material 
strategies created in the following years changed from trying to create a unified energy policy, into goal 
oriented strategies necessary for “economic prosperity and national defense of the United States” or 
“essential building blocks of the EU’s growth and competitiveness“ [8], [72]. China’s embargo even 
extended political alliances to the point that there is a Trilateral EU-US-Japan Conference on Critical 
Materials for government officials, industrial representatives, and researchers to exchange information on 
recent initiatives and future challenges [169]. With China developing trade alliances and trying to create a 
world where “all roads lead to China”, increased nationalistic tendencies will only aid in creating a future 







Figure 17: Impact of the energy transition on selected countries and groupings 
IRENA (2019) 
8.4 Technology Breakthroughs 
The “Technology breakthroughs” scenario sees technology being withheld as an asset, and limiting 
the spread and ease of low-carbon adoption. Problems with China stealing intellectual property and the 
importance of patents are already fostering a sense of competitiveness and are indicative of this scenario. 
Fortune reported this year that one in five U.S. corporations say they have had their intellectual property 
stolen by China, and a U.S. Trade Representative has estimated the annual loss to China is between $225 
billion and $600 billion [171]–[173]. With the rise in prominence of renewable energy, this trend is 
beginning to be seen in other areas as well. Chinese turbine maker Sinovel Wind Group Co. was ordered to 
pay $59 million in 2018 for stealing trade secrets, and a theft from a Scottish wave-power company in 2011 
went forgotten until a very similar renewable project appeared in China a few years later [171], [174]. The 
relative number of patents from each nation are shown in Figure 18, although the majority of patents are 
still held by individual nations, such as Germany in the EU [4]. Longitudinal studies have also shown that 
China’s share of patents in the renewable energy sector has increased in the last decades [4], [175]. 
However, such studies do not take the quality and significance of patents into consideration and may 
therefore overestimate China’s innovative leadership and control of renewable energy technologies. From 
a material perspective the role of technology breakthroughs become more apparent when considering what 
types of material investments various nations have been making. For China’s interest in manufacturing 
renewable technologies, securing supply chains is especially important in facilitating their role in the low-
carbon future. Similarly, the United States large share of patents relative to investment reflects their interest 








Figure 18:  Cumulative share of renewable energy patents end 2016  
IRENA (2019)  
 
9. Conclusions and Future Research  
This review was conceived as a problem-oriented perspective in order to identify gaps in strategy 
and policy relating to materials of the low-carbon energy transition. Although investigations into material 
needs have shown that physical scarcity will not be a limiting factor, it has become a much more 
complicated issue with environmental, social, political barriers to extraction and material security. China’s 
investment strategy, the pace of renewable energy integration across the world, and the general 
development of critical materials have shown that a passive interest in a low-carbon economy is not enough 
to achieve environmental goals. Active policy changes will be necessary to ensure that renewable 
technologies are adopted at a pace that both facilitates growth and allows for each nation to prepare for its 
eventuality. For economies across the world, this means solidifying pathways towards resource 
development, recycling programs, healthy extractive industries, and being aware of the geopolitical 
challenges that come with diverse energy needs. For most nations, there is a great deal that still needs to be 
understood about the transition, and  this review serves to highlight some of these questions. More focused 
investigations into decarbonization, material security, and technical challenges all need to be conducted to 
better understand how policy can adapt and respond to these challenges.  
To further these objectives, and with the understanding that the low-carbon transition requires 
collaboration and an interdisciplinary approach, the following are defined as areas for future research: 
 
● Undertaking further analytical work on the role and scale of metals and minerals in a low-carbon 
future will be required to create effective policy and mitigate risk. Uncertainties surrounding 
resource mapping, material needs, energy needs, and technological changes have broad influences 
that need to be understood and managed, especially in the context of developing nations. The 
disconnect between resource mapping and the role that renewable energy will play in Africa, South 
America, and countries parts of the Belt and Road Initiative creates serious information gaps for 
both international dialogue and domestic policy decision-making. It is also uncertain how much 







● Technology research, like that of the CMI and many other organizations, will also be essential in 
addressing bottlenecks, whether through the identification and design of substitute materials, 
improved recycling, or completely new technologies. Several of the CMI “Grand Challenges” are 
directly related to the issues discussed in this paper, including anticipating which materials may go 
critical. 
 
● Developing new financial instruments in the relevant commodity markets will help provide some 
level of risk mitigation and mandate increased levels of transparency. The largely inflexible and 
slow response nature of commodity markets presents numerous points of impairment for the energy 
transition. A better understanding of shortcomings and awareness of mitigating options will allow 
markets to sustain energy growth and development. 
 
● The role that developing technologies will play in the mining industry need to be explored and 
contextualized. Possible changes in transparency through Blockchain and efficiency innovations 
brought on by artificial intelligence, autonomous mining, and mining engineering all present 
opportunities and challenges for future development and resource management. Furthermore, 
defining and establishing sustainable mining practices need to be understood and properly 
incentivized. Failure to do so may trigger a backlash and opposition that reduce supply. 
 
● Researching and developing a harmonized framework for carbon accounting and science-based 
climate target-setting along minerals supply chains that enables supply chain partners and end 
consumers to adequately track and collaboratively reduce emissions from mining, beneficiation, 
transportation, and other related processes.   
 
 
Aside from future research, there are policy changes that can help to mitigate potential challenges across 
mineral and metal supply chains. For nations facing large geopolitical shifts, exploring these 
considerations and adopting relevant policies can aid in successfully navigating the energy transition:  
 
● Continued monitoring of governance metrics (through both the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
and the NRGI Index), and open dialogue with developing nation will be essential in properly 
supporting countries involved in the energy transition. Transparency with supply chains and the 
implications of legislative actions need to be considered when developing policy that affects the 
wellbeing of those in other nations. These considerations are also relevant in establishing dialogues 
between mining companies and government agencies in charge of plans for countering and 
preventing conflicts. In most countries, these dialogues are not well-established, and must be linked 
to wider efforts of conflict prevention and development. 
 
● Mapping the new geopolitical landscape, or at least the changes to its contours will be essential to 
informing foreign policy and diplomacy. New or repurposed UN bodies or Conventions may need 
to be put in place, and the potential role of each nation needs to be explored.  
 
● Integration and sourcing of information from previous measurement efforts of energy security and 
material development will likely prove valuable in both political and technical approaches. Lessons 
on mineral development, such as those presented by Argentina and Chile, may prove invaluable to 
Bolivia’s development of their own lithium resources. Other such relationships, and lessons on 





development. As such, nations should focus on developing bilateral and cooperative relationships 
for material and energy development. 
 
● Although trade policies, including tariff-setting mechanisms and dispute mechanisms are in place 
through the WTO, they will need to be augmented and refined to tackle the new patterns and scale 
in trade for certain of the minerals. 
  
Ultimately, achieving a low-carbon future will depend on a robust, transparent, accountable, and 
sustainable mineral and metal foundation.  Better grappling with how that foundation is conceived by the 
research community is an essential first step towards reaching the dual goals of decarbonization and 
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